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Participatory Transpersonalism:
Transformative Relational Process,
Not the Structure of Ultimate Reality
Editor’s Introduction

I

t may be a luminous interlude with a beloved, a
moment of radiant silence, or ecstatic union with a
phrase of music or the wide open world—something
larger and more alive than anything imaginable. Time
stops, grace descends as a lucent mist, and something
within you feels the heart of the world. These moments,
however fleeting, sustain the soul; they inspire and help
to make life worth living. Yet what do they mean? Perhaps
these are merely the side effect of some happenstance
chemical event in the brain (cf. Persinger, 2001), and
maybe cultural stories of mystical experiences and
exceptional capacities are just tales made up to explain
suggestion and neural noise.
While it oversimplifies, this dismissiveness is
close to much conventional academic stance toward
such reports, whether in religious studies or psychology.
This attitude is understandable given the difficulty of
obtaining empirical evidence for the cognitive value of
such experiences. Counter to this position are claims
that these experiences open the door to a hidden inner
dimension that science and psychology must either
dismiss or accept on faith, which takes the topic out of
the sphere of scientific inquiry altogether (Friedman,
2002). Yet there may be a way to consider these ephemeral
moments with an evidence-based science that neither
accepts nor rejects uncritically. To fashion this is a task
that a transpersonal approach to psychology may be able
to take up (cf. Hartelius, 2014a)—and it is to this end
that a careful focus on philosophy is necessary.
Imagine you are standing across from a painting
at a museum. You might describe it in ways that someone
standing next to you could affirm as accurate, or perhaps
supplement with slightly different words: “That is a
Rembrandt, a painting showing the bust of a young

woman against a dark background, with shadow on part
of her face. It looks like she is wearing a pearl necklace.”
A hundred people might look at the same painting and
be able to agree, more or less, with this description.
This is what generally counts as objective
knowledge—descriptions of things that pretty much
anyone could agree on. This assumes that the world is
made of objects, of things that can appear roughly the
same to many observers. Yet diaphanous glimpses that
seem to lift out of ordinary experience are not concrete
things, so they are quietly demoted to the status of
subjective daydreams and imagination. Given their
power within human experience, however, it seems
negligent to dismiss their legitimacy so simply.
Standing in the museum there is a sense in which
you are here, as observer, and the painting is there, on the
wall, as an object. In objective knowledge, your personal
hereness and your relationship with the painting is more
or less taken for granted, based on the assumptions that
standing in front of a painting is the right way to relate
to it and that anyone who was here would see much the
same thing. If you were a postmodernist, you might
challenge these assumptions by thinking of all the other
ways you could be in relationship with the painting:
you might invert it or view it through a kaleidoscope,
you might take a photo of it, turn the colors wild and
alive, cut the image into slices and rearrange them in
a way that evokes a throbbing animate force. Or, you
might consider that a person not oriented to fine arts
might think a “Rembrandt” was a new kind of digital
printer, or that a newborn might see only vague patterns
of dark and light. All of this play can lead to fresh and
creative approaches to the world, and can also be used
to deconstruct or reconstruct any piece of information,
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leaving no effective consensus and no reliable knowledge
(e.g., Rorty, 1979). While postmodern approaches can
thus challenge existing orthodoxies and resulting false
paradoxes, they are less helpful in developing productive
ways of understanding experiences that are already
marginalized and poorly understood.
It is for this conundrum that participatory
thought within transpersonal psychology (Ferrer, 2002),
drawing deeply on feminist thought, seems to offer a way
forward. From this standpoint, reality is not objective in
the conventional sense that it is separate from me or that
I can stand back from it and take it in like a painting on
the wall, and yet it is not merely subjective in the sense
that it is just something made up in the mind. Reality
is actual, real, but you and I are part of it, immersed
in it, not observers who can stand back from it and
give an objective account; the public space is woven of
relationships rather than constructed of separate objects
(cf. Thayer-Bacon, 2003, 2010). Reality is being on the
canvas and in the painting, and my relational perspective
is necessarily colored by my location (cf. Harding, 1991,
2004).
To apply this to the metaphor of a Rembrandt
painting, even if I am able to see the whole painting, it
is from the standpoint of a particular location within
the painting. If I am situated in what an art historian
might describe as the dark background color typical
of Rembrandt’s work, then the area around me may
seem dark, with lighter areas visible elsewhere; if I am
located in one of the painted pearls, I might describe the
foreground as bright and lustrous, surrounded by dark
areas farther out. My situatedness on the painting means
I cannot escape the fact that my experience is limited by
location, nor the fact that universal knowledge—which
implies knowledge either from no specific location
(Nagel, 1989) or from a detached location deemed
authoritative—is impossible for anyone to attain;
however, I can expand my understanding through
dialogue and relationship. In fact, the same locatedness
that makes universal knowledge unreachable makes
relationship both necessary and possible. For this reason
a participatory approach foregrounds the values that
inform relationship, and holds interest in speculations
about universals or ultimates primarily as these represent
co-created distillations of their respective value system.
In this sense, participatory thought invites
transpersonal psychology to a radical shift of focus
away from concern with objective universal truth about
transcendent reality, and toward a consideration of how a
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particular culturally situated vision fosters transformative
development of individuals and communities, and
cultivates compassion, respect, and symmetrical
relationship. It invites an approach to knowledge that
holds inclusiveness and diversity not only as preferable
and socially moral, but as imperative and indispensable
for effective knowledge creation (Hartelius, 2014b).
Efforts to reframe participatory thought as yet another
iteration of a perennial philosophy, which asserts
privileged knowledge about the objective nature of
ultimate reality (e.g., Abramson, 2015), fail to grasp the
nature of a participatory stance toward the ontological
status of any and all visions of ultimacy.
The early field of transpersonal psychology sought
to add to humanistic psychology by considering not only
the primacy of human experience and relationship, but
also the “farther reaches of human nature” (Maslow,
1969, p. 1), including peak experience, transcendent
experience, ultimate verities, and transcendent values.
Shortly after the inception of the field, Ken Wilber
(1975) proposed that all of these aspirations might point
toward a transcendent nondual ultimate dimension
beyond the dualities of human sense experience—an
ultimate that was the ontological source and goal of all
human spirituality.
This perennialist philosophy gained wide
acceptance within the transpersonal community and
remained as a dominant viewpoint (Rothberg, 1986)
until challenges by Ferrer (1998, 2002, 2009, 2011a)
and others (Hartelius, 2015a; Hartelius & Ferrer,
2013; Rothberg & Kelly, 1998; Schneider, 1987,
1989), and the development of participatory thought
as an alternate (Ferrer, 2002; Ferrer & Sherman, 2008),
gained considerable influence (Ferrer, 2011b). Critiques
of Wilber’s (e.g., 2000, 2006) integral theory include
concerns that it is metaphysical in the sense that no
independent evidence can be mustered to support the
primacy of the structure of reality that Wilber asserts,
and hierarchical in the sense that ultimate truth claims
for one version of reality reduces the status of all other
versions; furthermore, it fails to resolve the Cartesian
tension that, in a modernist context, devalues mystical,
spiritual, and other exceptional experiences as merely
subjective constructions.
In response to these and other critiques
Wilber (2000, 2006) has attempted to argue that his
integral theory has moved away from perennialism and
transcended metaphysics. These tactics can be rebutted
as ineffectual because they rely on limited definitions of

these terms tailored to suit Wilber’s purposes rather than
on conventional understandings (Ferrer, 2011a; Hartelius
& Ferrer, 2013; Hartelius, 2015a). In a notable recent
exchange John Abramson (2014), a proponent of Wilber’s
integral theory, argued that Hartelius and Ferrer (2013)
had misunderstood Wilber’s work. After a response by
Hartelius (2015a), Abramson’s (2015) rejoinder was to
abandon his original line of argument and argue instead
that participatory was another version of perennialism,
with Ferrer’s Mystery proposed as another instance of
Wilber’s nondual ultimate.
Many of the shortcomings of this characterization
of Ferrer’s thought have already been identified in some
detail (Hartelius, 2015b), but what deserves further
articulation is the fact that a perennialist author such
as Abramson employs a type of ontological claim about
the nature of ultimate reality that is largely counter to
the thrust of participatory thought. This distinction,
though conceptually subtle, is central to the dichotomy
between participatory and perennialist approaches. It is
subtle because participatory thought allows for multiple
culturally-situated ontological claims about ultimate
reality (e.g., Ferrer, 2011a) just as a perennialist approach
does (e.g., Wilber, 2006). The difference is not only in
how this apparent tension is resolved, but also and more
importantly, in the assumptions that inform a solution.
A perennialist approach considers multiple
culturally-situated claims about the nature of reality to
be imperfect reflections of an underlying nondual source.
This nondual is something that exists in the same way that
an object exists in conventional modernist thought: The
object exists in itself, without reference to, dependence
on, or relationship with any other, whether object or
subject (cf. en soi, Sartre, 1943); a rock is a rock is a rock,
whether it exists at the bottom of a stream or tumbling
though interstellar space, or whether it sits on the altar
of a meditator. The nondual of integral theory is held to
exist in a manner where existence itself is objective in this
way: this nondual exists in itself, as unchanging source
(cf. Wilber, 2006), unaffected by the creation to which
it gives rise, or the many traditions that bear it witness.
In participatory thought, however, existence is
not self-existent, but relational: The object is not primary,
but something that arises, as it were, out of a network
of relationships, a sort of intersubjective field. A rock is
a rock because I have relationship with it—and it with
me—and I simultaneously have relationships within
a community where other, similar relationships exist,
where the notion and language of “rock” have developed.

In other words, an ontological claim within participatory
thought is radically different than an ontological claim
within a perennialist system because the very notion of
what constitutes existence is different.
An ontologial claim within participatory
thought, then, is a claim about the existence of a particular
relationship, or relational field, and the dynamic relational
processes that arise within it. If I come to a rock with the
needs and actions of a geologist, the process that exists
as that relationship may be quite different than if I come
as a subsistence tribesperson seeking a tool for grinding
grain. Both relational processes actually exist, both are
ontologically real, and each will impact its participants
in differing ways—ways that in turn will shape the
processes of the relational field. In this way the whole is
more of a self-transforming or autopoietic (cf. Maturana
& Varela, 1980) relational process than a collection of
objects governed by rules.
From this stance the nature of the existence is
not objective: anything that exists is a transformative
relational process constituted and cocreated by its
participants, and as participants differ and relational
patterns evolve, what actually exists will necessarily shift.
In this way, culturally-situated ultimates actually exist
and are ontologically real within particular relational
fields; they will necessarily differ between communities
that participate in different relational fields. In Ferrer’s
(e.g., 2011) thought, then, multiple ontological claims
regarding ultimacy can coexist because they are claims
relating to ontologically real relational processes, not selfexistent objective-like referents.
This critique of objective existence is closely
related to the critique of universal knowledge claims that
has been developed in feminist thought (e.g., Haraway,
1988). A feminist approach argues that knowers are
always located in and colored by a particular place, time,
context, history, and body (Code, 1991; Harding, 1991),
and that universal knowledge, which claims to be free
from such influences, is logically impossible. This stance
resembles the earlier metaphor of how it is impossible
to describe a painting objectively from the standpoint of
being part of the painting.
To the degree that this argument is correct,
efforts at describing the nature of ultimate reality are
more about projecting one’s own location onto the whole
than about perceiving what is true. Wilber’s speculations
about a nondual source are no better and no worse
than any other mythology that arises from a particular
cultural location—in this case from the location of a

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

v

White American male interested in finding authoritative
knowledge about ultimate reality as reflected in all
spiritual traditions. While his system seeks to encompass
a great many traditions, it addresses them from the very
particular viewpoint of a historically and culturally
located, gender-bodied person (cf. Code, 1991; Harding,
1991). Neither an inner feeling of certainty nor any
number of other (predominantly male) thinkers offering
similar speculations—his so-called perennial sages
(Wilber, 2000)—make the case any stronger.
However, given that integral theory has
already appropriated most spiritual traditions of any
size, it is no surprise that it should attempt to do the
same with a competing theory that points to the highly
problematic shortcomings of its perennialist approach.
Cultural appropriation is the exploitation of other
cultures by a more dominant culture (e.g., Ziff & Rao,
1997), as when European-American culture takes on
Native American elements of dress or practice, outside
of the context of an informed and mutually respectful
relationship with the communities to whom these
cultural elements belong. Perennialism, which considers
itself superior to every tradition and self-authorized to
inform each tradition about its actual essence, is a strong
example of cultural appropriation (e.g., King, 2001). To
claim that participatory thought is really just another
version of perennialism is an extension of this naturally
appropriative stance.
The basis for this argument by integral theorists,
then, reveals its shortcoming: Abramson (2015) claimed
that participatory thought is perennialist in nature
based on the assumption that Ferrer’s notion of an
unknown Mystery underlying human spirituality could
be interpreted as making a similar claim as perennialism
about the objective nature of ultimate reality. Ferrer’s
thought (2002), on the other hand, is situated in an
entirely different ontology, a transformed notion of what
constitutes existence. Ferrer has consistently distanced
himself from perennialism based on this difference,
having noted that objectivist assumptions about reality
have deleterious impact on human values and relationship
and the cultivation of transformative potential. In
participatory approaches it is how an ultimate vision
reflects and shapes these latter that has primacy, not how
it might inform speculations about an ultimate objective
reality that, within participatory thought, has no actual
existence.
The challenge that integral perennialism set
out to resolve is nevertheless a worthy one: to construct
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a philosophical context in which both science and
scholarship can engage with those aspects of being human
that are both subtler and more powerful than the mundane
rhythms of daily life. By offering a frame in which objects
are the product of relationships, rather than vice-versa,
mystical, spiritual, and exceptional human experiences
can be considered as actually-existing relational events (cf.
Ferrer, 2008) rather than non-existing objects. By offering
a critical frame that nonetheless grants ontological reality
to these events, it becomes reasonable to seek ways that
these phenomena might be examined with a scientific
method that is rigorous in traditional ways yet subtly
transformed by application within a novel philosophical
context (cf. Hartelius, 2007). Here, then, may be the seeds
of a psychology that can pursue inquiry into presence,
attention, intuition, creativity, experiences of elevation,
transcendence and awakening, and the subtle dynamics
of mind and relationship, in a way that does not diminish
those phenomena through the application of ill-fitting
tools of analysis. The result may be not only a deeper
understanding of these exceptional human experiences
and capacities, but a revision of the psychological notion
of what it is to be human (Hartelius, Caplan, & Rardin,
2007).
In This Issue

I

n 1985 Linda Meyers published a paper in the
Journal of Black Psychology entitled, Transpersonal
Psychology: The Role of the Afrocentric Paradigm.
This paper pointed out the fact that the sort of integral
worldview favored by transpersonal psychology existed
in the African world view and in psychological theory
deriving from that world view. On discovering this
paper in the literature, I went directly to the Journal of
Transpersonal Psychology to see what response this might
have drawn. Here was an invitation to expand beyond
the approaches of East and West, and include another
great swath of human culture. There was, however, no
sign of a response from the transpersonal community in
its main journals. It is my hope that the Special Topic
Section, edited by Angelina Graham, may serve as a
belated response that acknowledges the importance—
indeed the indispensability—of the contribution and
participation of Black psychology in any comprehensive
approach to transpersonal psychology.
In addition to this special section, introduced
elsewhere by its editor, this issue offers a number of
engaging papers in its general section, as well as book

reviews and responses to the editor that are worthy of
attention.
First of these is a paper that presents validation
for a Chinese version of a spiritual intelligence scale. This
paper, by Arita Chan and Angela Siu, is descriptively
titled, “Application of the Spiritual Intelligence SelfReport Inventory (SISRI-24) Among Hong Kong
University Students,” and represents a piece of the
important work of bringing transpersonally relevant
concepts into diverse cultural contexts. It also reflects
the importance of scale development and other empirical
research for whole person approaches to psychology.
Kathleen Pantano and Jeremy Genovese offer
a novel study that inverts prior research: instead of
considering the impact of internally- or externallyfocused attention on a task such as balance training,
their research tests the imact of different forms of
attentional focus on the development of mindfulness.
This paper, entitled, “The Effect of Internally versus
Externally Focused Balance Training on Mindfulness,”
breaks important new ground on the relationship
between attentional focus and mindfulness in a manner
that promises to lead to future research.
Following this is a truly engaging paper on the
Norse war magic phenomenon of beserkergang, a type
of invulnerability magic that has often been considered
either mythic or the result of intoxication. Author
Jenny Wade makes a careful, detailed, and far-ranging
scholarly case for this phenomenon as a transpersonal
state of consciousness that confers remarkable abilities
far beyond conventional human capacities. This paper,
titled, “Going Berserk: Battle Trance and Ecstatic Holy
Warriors in the European War Magic Tradition,” includes
both ancient and contemporary sources, and offers
evidence for the limitations of such states.
Gabriel Crane’s paper, “Harnessing the
Placebo Effect: A New Model for Mind-Body Healing
Mechanisms,” is a refreshingly thorough and balanced
consideration of the difficult and often contentious topic
of the placebo effect. Weaving together developments
from transpersonal theory with empirical research, Crane
critiques contemporary models of the phenomenon and
offers a satisfying reframe on this elusive yet powerful
process. Crane’s paper also garnered a positive and
elucidating response from James Giordano, which is
included after the Special Topic Section.
In a related paper, Alix Sleight provides a
theoretical frame to help understand the power and
limitations of meaning-making in cancer patients. This

paper, “Liminality and Ritual in Biographical work:
A Theoretical Framework for Cancer Survivorship,”
considers the potentially disruptive impact of cancer
on the personal narrative, and how ritual processes can
help to resolve this in ways that promote wellbeing and
quality of life in ways that truly enhance the lives of
cancer patients and cancer survivors.
Finally, a Letter to the Editor from Judith
Blackstone opens long-overdue dialogue about the
meaning of nonduality, and whether there are grounds
for claiming that certain shifted states of mind that
soften conventional boundaries between body and world
are actually unconstructed states of consciousness that
reveal the essential nature of consciousness.
Glenn Hartelius, Main Editor
California Institute of Integral Studies
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